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ABSTRACT 
 
Geography plays a significant, fundamental role in shaping outcomes in human societies. 
Among other geographical elements, borders have significant implications"they are not 
only geographical figures, but also political creatures. Against previous theories that have 
studied border effects along with institutional differences mostly about economic 
implications, this thesis considers how sub-national borders with weak jurisdictions affect 
cultural, political, and economic phenomena using data from South Korea. Unlike 
international borders and intra-national borders in a federal state, this thesis suggests borders 
in a unitary nation have less economic effects, but more cultural and political effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
It will never be answered unambiguously what determines human society the most. 
Needless to say, numerous elements will synthetically form a way for people to live. 
However, it seems obvious that among other elements geography plays a significant, 
fundamental role in shaping outcomes in human societies." It is natural that geographical 
features provide the foundation of countries; where a nation is physically located influences 
patterns of endogenous lifestyle and who are the neighbor countries for the nation is likely to 
set up exogenous international relations (Gottmann 1951, 154).# These circumstances imply 
that geographical conditions have effects on countries’ history and culture. Not only for 
countries but also for individuals, geography determines many aspects of people’s sense of 
self; for instance, depending on the place where a person is born or grows up, he or she will 
have a different cultural identity, different nationality, and different institutional services for 
his or her lifetime.  
This suggests that geography has shaped a wide variety of the many aspects of human 
life over time and that outcomes affected by geography impact human behavior. In this sense 
that geography and human beings mutually affect each other, borders appear to be worth 
examining because they are not only physical, geographical figures, but also political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The role of geography has been emphasized in numerous fields of studies, such as biology, 
journalism, and philosophy. Apart from its extensive sense, this thesis focuses more on political-
related issues.  !
2 Gottman (1951, 154) expounded on the interrelationships between geography and international 
relations, saying “the environment provides the permanent material foundation both of nationalism, 
insofar as the nation is defined and affected by the territory it occupies, and of power, for a territory 
for the up-building of its status among other nations.” 
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structures (Alvarez 1995, 449);" borders have tended to be intentionally created by people in 
accord with their political perspectives, except in the case where are inevitable environmental 
constraints, such as mountains and rivers. Although many borders have been consciously 
designated by people to define jurisdictional, administrative divisions, and have become 
important due to the physically partitioned space, they have also mentally affected human 
beings in shaping the way people think about their nation-state.# National borders create 
imagined communities, in which are limited by boundaries and are sovereign where people 
tend to be presumably aware of their sovereignty with finite frontiers (Anderson 1983, 7). 
This factor about state sovereignty imposes more political implications on borders such as 
nationality and regional identity. 
As their origination suggests, since borders contain both geographical and political 
implications, they are likely to bring crucial consequences in domestic and international 
politics. Although some scholars believe we are living in a world where state borders are 
becoming obsolete and are no longer barriers to the movement of goods, ideas, and people,$ 
there have been widespread arguments that borders are still significant and even that they 
have become more important in the process of globalization.% 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Explaining borders as those that are directly relevant to research in political anthropology, Wilson 
and Donnan (1998) stated that borders are physical, literal structures of the state, which also structure 
a range of meaning and belonging associated with a variety of identities.  
4 Alvarez (1995), for instance, suggests that the “borderlands genre is a basis upon which to redraw 
our conceptual frameworks of community and culture.” 
5 Typically, Ohmae (1990) invented the idea of the “borderless world,” explicitly shown in the title of 
his book, regarding international borders have largely disappeared on a map showing economic 
activities. 
6 Borders have been argued to be important barriers to economic trade in the field of economic 
geography; moreover, they have been emphasized under the process of globalization because ethical 
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However, not all borders have the same significance; some borders offer important 
ramifications while others do not create distinguishing implications." Theoretically, 
international boundaries between two or more countries appear to have greater substantial 
effects on political, cultural, and economic outcomes than do boundaries within countries. 
The fact that national boundaries are disjointed points to autonomous countries partitioning 
jurisdictions enables them to have relatively large potential effects. On the other hand, sub-
national borders seem to be less influential because they are more purely administrative 
boundaries. Nonetheless, intra-national borders would have bifurcated characteristics 
depending on type of government!whether it is a unitary nation or a federal state!since 
borders within federal states, like the United States, also function as fairly powerful 
jurisdictional borderlines.  
Thus, existing theories on border effects could be classified as follows: 
 Table 1.1. The gap between existing theories on border effects. 
Existence of 
Border  Conditions  Outcome Examples 
BORDERNESS + Institutional Differences ! Effects 
National borders and 
sub-national borders in federal states 
BORDERNESS + NO Institutional Differences ! ? 
Sub-national borders in unitary 
nations 
BORDERLESS + NO Institutional Differences ! 
NO 
Effects !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and religious perspectives seem to become more important than the past. These arguments will be 
covered below.  
7 Borders could be defined in several ways (Starr and Most, 1976); however, even regarding the same 
kind of borders, not all border communities have the same characteristics, since not all are dissected 
by the border in the same way (Wilson and Donnan, 1998). This thesis generally addresses borders 
that divide physical places on the contiguous land.     
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According to previous theories as summarized in Table 1.1, borderness has been 
studied with institutional changes across borders, say, the borders between different countries 
or different states within a federation; borderlessness is necessarily assumed along with no 
institutional change and results in no effects. This suggests border effects and institutional 
distinctions such as policy differences have not been separated in border studies. To be more 
specific, therefore, it would be worth looking at places with borderness, but without 
institutional differences, to examine pure border effects regardless of institutional 
consequences. Borders are not only jurisdictional boundaries, but also affect a wide variety 
of human behaviors as mentioned above. Additionally, this study will be posed in between 
the two previous studies as shaded in Table 1.1.  
By this simple logic, this thesis will answer the question in the grey box on Table 1.1 
by exploring how human behavior would be affected by sub-national borders in a unitary 
nation like South Korea with less powerful jurisdictional boundaries. It will follow the three 
categories of cultural, political, and economic perspectives.  
 
Research Questions 
The following questions will be examined and answered: 
1. To what extent do border effects exist in borderlands with weak jurisdictional 
boundaries such as sub-national borders in a unitary nation?  
 
2. If they do exist, what are the cultural, political, and economic effects on human 
behaviors? 
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This thesis proceeds along the following lines. Chapter 2 will provide theoretical 
background for this research pointing out four hypotheses in three issue categories; Chapter 3 
will explain the case selection and methodology used throughout the study; Chapter 4 will 
analyze the main results and interpret them; lastly, the conclusion in Chapter 5 will describe 
the overall implications, additional discussions and suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE CONCEPT OF BORDER EFFECTS 
 
2.1. Existing Explanations and Empirical Findings 
As emphasized above, geography plays a major role in human societies. It has 
shaped, preserved, and transformed the way of human life. Nevertheless, geographical study 
had laid outside the mainstream of political and economic study until recent attention in the 
1990s." One of the most important reasons would be that it is usually difficult to determine a 
direct causation between regional geographical conditions and human behavior.# Therefore, 
scholars in the field of economic geography condense human behavior to regional institutions 
as they attempt to explain the relationship between geography and institutions. Although it 
still seems challenging to take geographical features into account because of their unique 
difficulty of being simplified, there are two big mainstream ideas!environmental 
determinism and spatial economy!relating closely to political geographic perspectives.   
Scholars, focusing on the role of inherent features of the landscape as significant 
determinants of shaping development patterns, are represented by Jeffrey Sachs. They 
maintain that physical location of a nation offers favorable domestic environments to 
economic growth for some countries, but unfavorable ones for others and that these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 When there was a surge of interest in the geographical aspects of development, Krugman (1999) 
mentioned it is surprising that “it took so long for this interest to become a main stream concern 
within economics.” He has attributed the negligence of spatial issues in economics to the tendency 
that favors modeling countries as dimensionless points and with spaceless representation (Krugman, 
1991). 
9 Starr and Most (1976, 582-585) pointed out the difficulty of conceptualization, operationalization, 
and measurement of borders and of connecting them to human behaviors. They assumed little 
attention has been paid to borders, while borders are important in understanding the shape of the 
international system and are part of those structural characteristics that affect the interaction 
opportunities of nations. 
  
 7!
environmental conditions affect shape to institutional circumstances (Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger, 1998; Sachs, 2001, 2003). Krugman, on the other hand, is well-known for the 
group of scholars who instead attribute spatially uneven economic outcomes to regional 
institutions. Krugman and others, who adhere to the so-called the new economic geography 
(NEG), account for how strongly endogenous decisions affect the distribution of economic 
activities across space and regional disparities (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999).  
These two mainstream approaches are seemingly contradictory; however, both 
consider endogenous location as an important determinant that makes for regional 
differences. In this sense, border studies appear to be one of the significant areas to 
examine,"# in that borders, geographical creations, also bring about meaningful variations.""  
To the extent that borders demarcate both geographical and institutional divisions, 
they need to be specified in terms of their jurisdictional power. In short, international borders 
and sub-national borders within a federal state function as powerful jurisdictional boundaries, 
implying large potential effects; whereas, sub-national borders in a unitary nation would play 
a role of dividing nations into units more like administrative districts because of their weak 
jurisdictional ramifications. Although most borders often are assumed to transform some 
human behaviors, they vary in how much and in which way they influence human beings. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As borders are important figures by themselves, borderlands also tend to be worth examination. 
Wilson and Donnan (1998) emphasized borderlands as contradictory zones of culture and political 
power. 
11 Like these literatures on economic geography regarding environments and institutions, border 
studies have mainly focused on their effects on economic activities. Borders, however, appear to be in 
the middle of geography and institutions. They have more geographical implications than institutions 
and more political consequences than the natural environment. Thus, they should be examined in 
more than just an economic perspective; they may influence cultural and political phenomena.  
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Since previous literatures has studied border effects with two national and sub-national 
groups, their arguments are reviewed within this thesis’s basic question. 
!
National border studies 
In the field of political science, it was true that borders were simply of very little 
interest to students of international relations despite their possible roles (Starr and Most, 
1976). Over the past 30 years, however, borders have been studied from a number of 
perspectives, especially in political economy along with rising interest in geographical 
conditions. 
In terms of economic outlook, Ohmae (1990, 172) provoked the discussion about 
borders, arguing the end of the nation state, because international borders have little to do 
any longer with the movement of capital. Although his claim sparked further discourse on 
international borders, a “borderless world” in his terms seems plausible, but not practicable, 
in the real world. Indeed, national borders have been consistently documented as having 
negative impacts on the volume of international trade, supported by substantial data."#  
Describing their empirical findings as border effects, political economists insist 
national borders do make a difference (McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 1996; Evans, 2003). 
McCallum (1995) documented the “home bias” in international trade. He compared trade 
flows among Canadian provinces with those between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. He 
calculated that Canadian provinces traded about twenty times as much with each other as 
they did with U.S. states of a similar size and distance. His claim was very compelling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Proving the presence of border effects has attracted scholastic attention because it seems to claim 
borders have something to do with international trade beyond the gravity model, started by Anderson 
(1979) and commonly used to explain trade.     
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because, first and foremost, it empirically supports the idea that borders have more effects on 
economic performance than does physical distance. Also, since Canada and the U.S. seem to 
have the lowest trade barriers!sharing similarity in language, culture, and 
institutions"#!their border effects more clearly show their implications.   
Other scholars confirmed McCallum’s view of borders as trade barriers. According to 
Helliwell (1996, 1998), even Quebec, a province that does not share language and culture 
with other provinces in Canada, traded twenty times more with other provinces within the 
nation than it did with U.S. states. Moreover, scholars like Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000) 
found a strong home bias within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries and European Union (EU) national borders. Wei (1996) 
demonstrated that an average country imports about two and one-half times as much from 
itself as from an otherwise identical foreign country, after controlling for size and distance. 
Nitsch (2000) examined EU countries in a more collaborative economic union and found 
their intra-national trade is about ten times as high as international trade with an EU partner 
country of similar size and distance.   
As seen above, their overall argument suggests decisive national border effects on 
international trade patterns. It straightforwardly maintains that national borders still are 
important. Then, this raises a further question about borders: Do sub-national borders also 
make a difference?  
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 In other words, border effects found at permeable boundaries tend to be more significant, since this 
excludes other possible effects and draws attention to border effects themselves. This fact is 
associated with the topic of this thesis: border effects with largely permeable sub-national boundaries.     
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Sub-national border studies 
Continuing from comparative studies of intra- and international trade patterns 
showing national border effects, the effects of sub-national territorial boundaries have been 
also studied. In this case, the U.S. most often has been taken as the observed country owing 
to the data availability and the fact that it is a federal state."# Thus, how U.S. state borders 
affect human behavior is the goal they try to find.   
Following “home bias” literatures, Wolf (2000) extended the idea of national border 
effects on international trade to sub-national border effects on intra-national trade in the U.S.  
He demonstrated U.S. state borders impede trade within the country, too. Following his 
argument, Hillberry and Hummels (2003) took it up although they found home bias one-third 
as large as Wolf (2000) did. Millimet and Osang (2007) revealed the robustness of sub-
national border effects in their article that tested home bias effects on intra-national trade, 
controlling for unobserved time invariant attributes and reflecting prices, wages, and internal 
state distance.  
Holmes (1998) had a somewhat different point of view. He started a discussion about 
sub-national border effects as coming up with the effects of policy differences on economic 
activities. He claimed different policies between two regions partially determine where the 
manufacturing industry would be located across states in the U.S., as uncovering a large, 
abrupt increase in manufacturing activity when one crosses a state border from a state 
without right-to-work law into a state with right-to-work law. Given his evidence, it implies 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 A number of literatures assume border effects originate from the fact that borders separate 
jurisdictional distinctions (Holmes, 1998; Urbatsch, 2006). 
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that sub-national borders in the U.S. do also matter; it is, though, not the same way national 
borders affect economic performances.    
Turning to a more political perspective, Urbatsch (2006) pointed out different 
characteristics on political engagement between people near borders and people elsewhere. 
His argument can be interpreted as evidence of sub-national border effects, since he 
suggested that state borders in the U.S. let borderland people exhibit different preferences 
over particular politics due to the different escapability, in his terms, of policies.  
As previous studies demonstrate, national borders and sub-national borders in a 
federal state do seem to have some effects on political and economic activities. Nonetheless, 
there still remain a few questions about what happens if there are no constraints like 
institutional differences, at the border area. How would people be affected by geographical 
boundaries beyond circumstances noted in the previous literature? National borders imply a 
variety of variations, such as cultural and political differences"# and sub-national borders, as 
jurisdictional territories in a federal state refer to policy differences. In other words, it also 
means that border effects in this context are tangled with nationality effects or policy effects 
rather than pure border effects. Then, the question arises: What are the pure geopolitical 
border effects? Or, do the pure border effects even exist? 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Even if we acknowledge the economic integration due to extensive international trade ignoring 
border effects, there still are national characteristics. Konrad and Nicol (2008) were skeptical about 
optimism that economic cooperation leads to social and cultural integration, even between Canada 
and the U.S.!
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2.2. Border Effects in a Unitary Nation  
Articles on sub-national border effects tend to focus on policy differences and 
attribute border effects to them as primarily exploring a federal state for their case study."# 
These articles argue that sub-national border effects are caused by strong jurisdictional 
distinctions. Holmes (1998) promptly assumed the state characteristics unrelated to policy are 
the same on both sides of the border concerning the location of industry. At state borders, he 
noted the geographic determinants of the distribution of manufacturing!for example, 
climate, soil fertility, access to transportation, and the level of agglomeration benefits!are 
approximately the same. Thus, he straightforwardly insisted the affects of location on 
industry are a matter of policy. In addition, Urbatsch (2006) repeatedly highlighted the 
jurisdictional borders with real power. Assuming the jurisdictions have substantial authority 
to affect citizens’ lives, he demonstrated that borders within a nation under unitary 
government are unlikely to change outcomes. 
However, when looking at the regional differences in South Korea, a unitary nation 
with intense homogeneity, it seems questionable what sub-national borders mean in this 
country because regionalism has played the most significant role in South Korean elections.  
As seen on Figures 2.1 and 2.2, regardless of whether a presidential or parliamentary 
election, South Korea is undoubtedly divided into east and west sides."$ Regionally divided !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 After McCallum’s article in 1995, following literature tends to mostly deal again with the U.S. 
national borders by examining Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders. Then, along with these studies, 
literature focusing on the sub-national border effects has also examined the U.S. states as the unit of 
analysis.!
17 In general, all South Korean elections seem regionally divided because the major political parties in 
South Korea are regionally supported. More specifically, however, the presidential election seems to 
show more regionally-divided results, while the parliamentary election seems to have a little more 
variation in terms of political parties.   
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election results often turn into overheated political disputes; this division affects overall 
political decisions in South Korea.  
!
    
!
 
!
 
 
             
 
Figure 2.1. Presidential election                 Figure 2.2. Parliamentary election 
results in 2002.18                                         results in 2004.19 
!
Dramatic differences in economic development between the east and west of South Korea 
also show regional differences across the sub-national borders. It appears to be one of the 
reasons driving the divided political preference. Besides, geographical conditions cover 70 
percent of the Korean peninsula with mountains that engender local cultural differences. 
Based on these facts, it appears to be worth examining sub-national border effects in 
South Korea from the perspective that it is a unitary nation having no policy differences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Provinces and cities majority won by Roh, Moo-hyun (left) and Lee, Hoi-chang (right). Roh and 
Lee were candidates from the two major parties in South Korea, United Democratic Party and Grand 
National Party, respectively. The figure was exerted from 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_presidential_election,_2002>, accessed 05 April 2010. 
19 Provinces and cities majority won by GNP (left), Uri (right). GNP stands for Grand National Party, 
and Uri represents United Democratic Party. The figure was exerted from 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_legislative_election,_2004>, accessed 05 April 2010. 
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across borders. Not only inspired by Urbatsch’s doctoral dissertation revealing the 
characteristics of people on the borderland, but also articles claiming regionalism in South 
Korea,"# this paper will concentrate on the different characteristics of people near sub-
national borders by comparing with people elsewhere in South Korea."$ This analysis might 
seem specific to Korea’s unique characteristics in some senses, but based on these intuitive 
regional differences in South Korea, more general hypotheses about border effects will be 
applied to this country to show how sub-national border effects might arise in a unitary 
nation. 
 
Scenario 1. Border effects on cultural phenomena 
Returning to straightforward geographical effects,"" physical distance is the key 
concept of spatial studies; it appears and actually is the stimulus that naturally brings about 
the intimacy between neighboring countries."% Scholars have proven frequent interactions 
between physically close countries and have extended these practical aspects to the cultural 
and political identities.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Articles about regionalism in South Korea mostly criticize two distinctive territory-based political 
supports between the east and the west of South Korea (Park 2003; Kwon 2004). 
21 Since South Korea is a unitary nation, this will eliminate border effects derived from nationality 
and policy differences. Also, ethical territories mentioned by John Williams (2006) can be also 
eliminated: Williams (2006) disagreed with the concept of “borderless world” by pointing out 
separation as part of a global ethics of toleration, which has always taken a territorial form. 
Additionally, since data on North Korea is unavailable, this thesis will focus on South Korea.    
22 Since most border studies take jurisdictional boundaries into account, as concerning geographical 
features, it must be noted this thesis will consider more substantive geographical conditions, such as 
physical distances. As mentioned, this author believes border effects should not be diluted by other 
institutional consequences.      
23 Pearson (1974, 433) stated we “know” that states are more concerned with and more likely to 
intervene in neighboring than distant states. 
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Thelen (1999) highlighted borders as sites of division but also of interaction between 
individuals from many backgrounds, hybridization, creolization, and negotiation. To a certain 
extent, although some argued the divide created by international borders has been 
strengthened and enforced by various citizenship and passport requirements (Lofgren, 1999), 
scholars in a wide variety of fields have studies linked to dividing borders to dynamic 
activities induced by trade, commercial flows, and migration (Malkki, 1995). 
Indeed, there is substantial literature addressing the significance of physical distance 
in determining international relations, such as trade and conflict. Two seemingly conflicting 
arguments have been widespread; many argue that contiguous countries are more conflict 
prone thus distance deters conflict while similarly many argue that costs of trade rise with 
geographical distance, thus distance deters trade (Chang et al., 2004). Yet, if this is the case, 
it is clear that both show there exists a tight relationship between adjacent countries whatever 
the interaction. 
Going further with previous dynamics of interaction near borders, borderland 
residents might be more favorable to trade, communication, and leave to different provinces 
than people elsewhere based on gained trust"# with neighbors and their previous experiences, 
which offers information about foreign regions. At this point, define cosmopolitan"$ as a 
person who is more willing to interact, communicate, and trade with others from foreign 
areas with a less strong regional identity. Then, it can be expanded as cosmopolitanism in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 According to Tam Cho and Nicley (2008), the historic propagation of a unified national territory, 
perpetuated by constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement, commerce, and information among 
U.S. states, lends credence to the expectation of muted effects.  
25 Because the idea of cosmopolitan contains various meanings, it could be vague to use this term in 
an academic paper. However, if it is used in a qualified sense mentioning people who willingly 
interact with strangers and who are not strongly attached to their own region, it would well describe 
the characteristics of people who are open-minded to non-nativeness.  
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borderland. In social theory, Delanty and Rumford (2005) explored the cosmopolitan quality 
of Europe regarding the EU as the concept of society, which is not a mere economic 
cooperative union but a multinational community. This suggests that people exposed closely 
to various borders and different neighbors seem more likely to be cosmopolitan because 
people are social beings, influenced by those with whom they interact and who reside in 
geographically-proximate locations (Tam Cho, 2003; Baybeck, 2006; Darmofal, 2006). 
Altogether, given theories, their intimacy and interaction on the borderlands come to 
the integration of divergent trends and cultural diversity. When ethnographers study border 
people, they do so with the intention of narrating the experiences of people who often are 
comfortable with the notion they are tied culturally to many other people in neighboring 
regions. They assume international borders, as well as intrastate borders, as political and 
cultural boundaries permeable in the everyday lives of border people (Wilson and Donnan, 
1998).  
Remarkable dynamics near the U.S.-Mexico border make it popular in border identity 
studies. Political and economic contexts of international borders are featured in analyses of 
the U.S.-Mexico border, where the issues of underdevelopment, transnationalism and the 
globalization of power and capital (Alvarez, 1995). Moreover, their interactions have been 
intriguing in the manner by which they have resulted in new and complex identities, blurring 
and integrating the characterizations of Mexicans, Latinos, and Americans (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 1992; Kearney, 1995; Tam Cho and Nicley, 2008). In this regard, it seems the role 
of localized social relations and geographic proximity establishes how people behave and 
interact with other regions. 
 
 17!
! Hypothesis 1: People who live in the border region tend to be more cosmopolitan"# 
than people elsewhere. Since they are not afraid of foreignness, they would be willing 
to move out to different districts, work outside their region, and marry foreigners. 
 
Scenario 2. Border effects on political engagement 
Political engagement is also a possible way to look at sub-national border effects. 
When Urbatsch (2006) accounted for intra-national border effects, he confirmed their 
substantive effects on human behavior proving that political participation, notably electoral 
turnout, is markedly lower near borders and borderland residents vote in referendums for 
predictably different policies than their compatriots elsewhere in the realms of tax, 
regulatory, and social policy. Yet, his argument strongly focused on a federal state in which 
policy differences are found. When it comes to a unitary nation like South Korea, he 
suggested there is no reason to expect a unified jurisdiction to exhibit the same outcomes as 
the same territory would when fragmented into several jurisdictions.  
Although the map (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) indicates an extreme difference in political 
party preference at the regional district level between the west coast and the east coast of 
South Korea, based on Urbatsch’s idea, it is a moot point if there would be any difference in 
terms of political engagement ignoring political preferences. At the same time, since the data 
for 2007 presidential election and 2008 parliamentary election turnouts show there exists a 
few tendencies, such as people who live in a certain province participate more in elections, 
people who live in a city participate less in voting than people elsewhere. Thus, it can be 
assumed that geographical location has something to do with political participation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Although cosmopolitan has a variety of meanings, in this paper, it refers to a person who 
disapproves of traditional geopolitical divisions. 
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In a country like South Korea, political participation seems likely to be involved with 
how strongly people feel about political competition. For instance, if the electorate in a 
certain constituency could anticipate which candidate might be elected, they would not 
necessarily participate in voting; however, if the competition between the candidates is 
intense and people cannot predict who might win an election, voting participation will cause 
higher turnouts.  !
In this sense, this paper would apply bilateral identity near borders!regarding 
cultural identity!to political participation."# Since South Korean politics has a strong 
competition, based on regional-oriented political parties, each province’s electorate tends to 
vote for its preferred political party to win over the competition. However, people near sub-
national borders would not be interested in national elections as much as people elsewhere 
because of their weak partisanship.  
 
! Hypothesis 2: In a unitary nation with no escapability of policies, people who live 
near the sub-national borders are not expected to have the same voting behavior as 
people who live in a federal state. However, borderlanders28 would be still expected 
to engage less in political participation than people elsewhere because the 
competition for the election will be weak near borders, due to border influences.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Political participation, used in the same way as political engagement in this context, here means the 
political involvement by means of voting for political elections. Although there would be other ways 
to participate in politics such as donations, for data availability and simplicity, this paper considers 
political engagement only via voting behavior.  
28 “Borderlander” is used as a simple way referring to people in borderlands. 
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Scenario 3. Border effects on economic performance 
In terms of economic perspective, the theories on borderland are conflicting. It seems 
to have a tight connection to theories about the relationship between the state and its regions, 
which often takes a top-down view where all power flows from the ‘center’ to the 
‘periphery.’ Since the border zone is distant from the center area, according to the theory of 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), which encompasses the main place and a higher income rate, 
the border region seems relatively unproductive compared to the central place."# Yet, on the 
other hand, it has been also argued that the border region tends to trade with different regions 
more than do places away from borders, due to transportation costs.$% In the sense 
transportation costs determine the volume of trade within and between countries,$& Rauch’s 
(1991) model suggests port cities attract economic activities because they have low access 
costs to foreign markets; furthermore, since trade does not only take place via ports, but 
goods are also directly transported across borders from land-to-land, border regions could 
also have a geographic advantage in attracting firms, due to their proximity to foreign 
markets (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2004). Thus, against center-periphery theories, it can be 
assumed that border regions are more likely to thrive by lively trade and trades, and as a 
result generate economic growth in borderlands.  
Furthermore, since manufacturing businesses tend to spend more for transportation 
costs than other industries, they will rather locate around borders, where it is not only close to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Supposing borders are impermeable within a closed economy, Losch (1944) described a border 
region as a desert because they would have only little economic activities and would have only firms 
requiring a mall market area regarding borders as distortions. 
30 The region’s geographic position is important regarding regional adjustments to trade, since 
location is decisive for access costs to foreign markets (Niebuhr and Stiller, 2004). 
31 By integrating theories of location and international trade, Ohlin (1967) concludes that altogether 
essential results on international trade can be applied to interregional trade relations as well.  
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their district, but closer to different districts, because the borderland has a productive 
environment with lively trade. Considering the advantages of border regions as major 
transportation points, manufacturing activities requiring constant use of transportation will be 
located along the borders.!
 
! Hypothesis 3a: In borderlands, there will be more trade than the center area. A 
brisk trade will consequently generate economically-productive activities. Thus, 
people near borders are more likely to join economic activities than people 
elsewhere, and, as a consequence, economic growth near borders will be higher than 
elsewhere.  
 
! Hypothesis 3b: Compared to other industries, manufacturing business will be more 
popular in border regions than in non-border regions because of their regional 
advantage of transportation.  
 
The theories described above suggest there may be some sub-national border effects 
in a unitary nation like South Korea, but that these would be different from the ones expected 
in a federal state. Hence, this thesis will test sub-national border effects within South Korea 
by different means of analyses. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Case Explanation 
!
Case selection: Pure border effects in South Korea 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are several reasons that make South Korea as an 
eligible country to find pure border effects beyond its regional differences at the first glance. 
First and foremost, South Korea is a unitary nation based on one national law system 
determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea."# Although it has local governments 
at each province and special, metropolitan city level, they are semi-autonomous. Their 
autonomy does not extend to the judicial sector, as local governments have very limited 
policy-making authority, which is trivial compared to that found in a federal state. Therefore, 
no one has a chance to escape from certain policies, such as moving to other provinces or 
cities in South Korea. This fact thus eliminates previously found sub-national border effects 
relating to policy differences between two regions.  
Secondly, South Korea is a homogeneous society with an absolute majority of the 
population of Korean ethnicity. As distinguished from neighboring populations of mainland 
Asia and Japan in terms of ethnicity, culture, and language, Korean people are known as one 
of the world’s most homogeneous ethnicities. This homogeneity of South Korea suggests 
ethnic conflicts or ethnically troubled areas, which can severely affect people with territorial 
issues, are unexpected in the South Korean Peninsula.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The Constitution of the Republic of Korea was promulgated on July 17, 1948, at the time Korea 
was split into South Korea and North Korea, when both inaugurated their own governments. 
Therefore, South Korea has been a unitary nation since its establishment. 
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Third, the geographical conditions of South Korea seem intuitively appropriate for 
examining sub-national border effects in that it is a relatively small peninsula surrounded by 
water on three sides. To the extent this thesis takes physically contiguous borders into 
account and South Korea does not have any contiguous international borders, this country 
may not be an implicational case when exploring national border effects."" However, 
regarding borders within a nation, its geographical conditions seem to highlight sub-national 
border effects, as eliminating the effects fostered by international borders. In addition, the 
fact that South Korea has relatively constant ecological conditions across the country, due to 
its size, controls the likelihood of regional exotic differences. Its territory covers a total area 
of 100,032 , smaller than most of the states in the United States. In this respect, it seems 
reasonable to assume that inherent geographical environments would not affect a way people 
behave. 
!
 Administrative divisions of South Korea 
! For the inspection of border effects within South Korea, the administrative 
divisions,"# which geographically and politically create sub-national boundaries in the nation, 
should be examined first by pointing out the provincial boundaries that will be mainly 
considered in this thesis. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 While South Korea is surrounded on three sides by the oceans, it shares a northern border with 
North Korea, which is an international boundary. But, this border is different from other international 
borders in that it hardly allows interaction between the two Koreas; it seems more like an 
impermeable hindrance. There is even a demilitarized zone around the South-North Korean border, 
which blocks any source of connection between them.  
34 It also means jurisdictions in South Korea, but as noted, since it functions more as an 
administrative district due to weak jurisdictional power of sub-national borders in this country. This 
study uses the term that explicitly shows its role. 
! 
km2
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South Korea consists of eight provinces called Do, one special autonomous province 
called Jachido, six metropolitan cities called Gwangyeoksi, and one special city called 
Teukbyeolsi, as shown in Table 3.1. These 16 districts are usually considered as primary 
administrative divisions that have a local government at the provincial level. At the 
municipal level, these 16 districts are subdivided into several types of districts, Gu, Gun, and 
Si, according to their industrial development and population density. 
Table 3.1. Administrative divisions of South Korea. 
Provincial level! Municipal level Sub-municipal level 
Special City 
Teukbyeolsi Seoul 
Ward 
Gu 
Ward 
Gu 
 Dong Tong 
Metropolitan 
City 
Gwangyeoksi 
Incheon, Busan, Daegu, 
Gwangju, Daejeon, 
Ulsan Eup County 
Gun  Myeon 
Eup 
/Myeon 
Li 
Province 
Do 
Gyeonggi, Gangwon, 
North and South 
Chungcheong,  
North and South Jeolla, 
North and South 
Gyeongsang 
City 
Si Gu 
Dong 
Special 
Province 
Jachido 
Jeju-island City Si  Dong 
Tong 
Ban 
Table 3.1 clearly shows how South Korea has been divided into sub-level 
administrative divisions. When discussing sub-national boundaries in this country, Table 3.1 
suggests it would be reasonable to consider the provincial level of districts as primary 
administrative divisions in this study"# because their sub-units, shaded in Table 3.1, are 
appropriate in terms of their comparability and size. Besides, the sub-municipal level of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Historically, these provinces have been considered as primary districts since the 11th century.   
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districts varies across provinces; some are too small or too underpopulated to obtain 
sufficient data. !
Given the provincial level, however, there are still a few factors that should be taken 
into account in the context of South Korea’s peculiarities. First, it should be noted that three 
provinces!Chungcheong-do, Jeolla-do, and Gyeongsang-do!could be considered as a 
single province. As seen in Table 3.1, these provinces are administratively composed of north 
and south sides. Nevertheless, as explicitly seen in the names of places, both north and south 
sides of these provinces share more historical and cultural inheritances than other 
provinces."# Also, even though each has a local government, the most they can do is to 
decide how national policies will be implemented and national policies tend to regard both 
parts simultaneously.  
Second, metropolitan cities must be differentiated from the special city, Seoul, as well 
as other provinces. Although some cities have been raised to the status of metropolitan city 
because of their high population and economic growth, they are not comparable to the capital 
city and other provinces. Rather, metropolitan cities are observed as major cities, which are 
included in a certain province. Like the south and north sides of Chungcheong, Jeolla, and 
Gyeongsang provinces, metropolitan cities share the historical and cultural inheritances with 
the province they are located. Hence, these cities will be considered as other municipalities in 
a province at their sub-level of Gu. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 For instance, when it comes to dialects, both sides of Chungcheong, Jeolla, and Gyeongsang 
provinces share the local language; this tendency is the same with food, political party preference, and 
so on. Since border comes to be significant in terms of political and cultural perspective in this paper, 
the borders cutting north and south sides of these provinces do not have meaningful implications. !
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Therefore, this paper will mainly take seven provinces and 234 municipalities in these 
provinces. Regardless of their titles such as Gu, Gun, and Si, municipalities, highlighted in 
grey in Table 3.1, will be treated equally.   
The sub-national borders concerned in this paper are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Provincial level districts of South Korea."# 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Seven provinces on the map are the provincial level districts on Table 3.1. Thus, the boundaries of 
these seven provinces are the sub-national borders throughout this paper. 
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3.2. Data and Methods 
 
Data 
 Data for this thesis mainly come from Statistics Korea (KOSTAT),"# the Bureau of 
Statistics of South Korea. Since 1948, as a government-affiliated organization, KOSTAT has 
been projecting national statistical duties, setting statistical standardization, and taking charge 
of various kinds of statistical tasks. Since they have stored a wide variety of data with 
running national-wide research for decades at various levels, it is an efficient way to choose 
some of their aggregated data for my theories.  
Hypotheses presented in this thesis mention individual behavior. In this case, a person 
near borders would be more likely to move to a different province than a person elsewhere. 
So, it seems sensible to use the disaggregated level of data usually gathered by surveys. 
However, KOSTAT’s aggregated data at the municipality level will be used as the unit of 
analysis. Although the use of aggregated data to explain individual behavior can result in an 
ecological inference fallacy misleading some of the individuals, this will be largely 
compensate by offering a more complete dataset. 
Regarding provincial boundaries, the municipal level administrative divisions, grey 
colored boxes shown in Table 3.1, will be the unit of analysis in this project. As noted above, 
the appropriate sub-national borders for the purpose of this thesis are the lines dividing 
provinces including Seoul, the capital city.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 The Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) was renamed as Statistics Korea (KOSTAT) on July 
6, 2009. 
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Methods 
 The explanatory variable through four hypotheses in this thesis is the proximity to a 
border which seems like a simple, but problematic concept. Although there are some ways to 
mathematically calculate physical distance concerning its effects in economic theories, here, 
it would not make sense to link numerical distance with human behavior. Rather, since this 
study takes a municipality as a unit of analysis, each municipality will be defined if it is near 
borders or not. For instance, if the boundary of a certain municipality formulates a part of 
primary sub-national borders in South Korea, that municipality will be considered as a border 
region.  
 The concept of borderland, the central idea of this project and the fact that this paper 
regards borders as the cutting lines of contiguous land, raises the question about coastal 
areas. Although this paper concerns borders defining geographical boundaries based on 
contiguous land, since coastal locales are also places where legal jurisdiction and political 
entity ends, coastal locations should not be taken as other places."# Thus, coastal location is 
also included as an independent variable. In addition, the municipalities adjoining North 
Korea are coded as another independent variable. Although the border between the two 
Koreas is not a sub-national border, it is an end point of jurisdiction, similar to the coastal 
line. Separating the main border regions, therefore, will explain the effects of the border 
between North and South Korea. 
 In accordance with each hypothesis, as the dependent variables apply to tests justified 
through theories, the control variables, which substantially increase an explanation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Coasts offer edges, which are one of the characteristics of borders, but without borders (Urbatsch 
2006, 17).!
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ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analysis, must be reviewed. First and foremost, 
urban characteristics, such as population and population density, must be controlled in a 
country, especially like South Korea, in that it is a regionally-biased country!the population 
is unevenly distributed, economic growth is different between districts, and the 
administration is concentrated in a certain area. By controlling population and population 
density, this study could explain how borders affect human behaviors without regard to 
population context. Additionally, the same logic suggests that the capital and metropolitan 
cities in this country should be controlled by reason of their urban-bias.   
 Islands surrounded by oceans on all sides are controlled, due to the same reason of 
having coastal location as an independent variable,"# and to investigate regional 
characteristics,"$ each province has a dummy variable named “Province Fixed Effects.”   !
 The following is a list of the variables used, their corresponding meaning, and how 
they were coded: 
 
Explanatory Variables 
“Internal border” – Refers to the municipality which boundary to a certain extent forms 
primary sub-national borders. These places, coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, are the borderlands 
in this context."%  !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Also, islands in South Korea would be likely to have the opposite characteristics as urban ones 
because of their isolation from the main peninsula.  
41 As noted above, South Korea is well known for its homogeneity. At the same time, it is the fact 
there is regionally uneven economic development in South Korea. Moreover, political party 
preferences between provinces are clearly divided.  
42 The border between South and North Korea is not considered as a meaningful boundary in this 
thesis because it may entirely shut down movement (Urbatsch, 2006). Unless it is adjacent to the sub-
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“Coast” – Refers to the municipality with boundary adjoining an ocean. These places, coded 
as 1 and 0 otherwise, are the coastal locations in this context. Islands are also classified as 
“Coast” since they adjoin an ocean, too.  
“Internal border*coast” – Refers to the municipality that is borderland as well as coastal 
locations. These places are coded as the value of multiplication of “Internal Border” and 
“Coast” variables. Although this sort of region is rare, it should be counted, since they could 
have varying regional characteristics, due to their regional uniqueness. 
“Northern border” – Refers to the municipality, which boundary to a certain extent forms 
the border between North and South Korea. Simply, in a sense that the border between the 
two Koreas offers the edge of South Korea, it should be concerned as an independent 
variables despite the fact there are only eight municipalities coded as 1 for “NB” variable 
and they are not expected to have significant effects.43         
 
Control Variables 
“ln(pop)” – Refers to the national log of population. Since the raw numbers of population do 
not follow the normal distribution, logged population is used due to its inclination of standard 
normal distribution.   
“ln(p-density)” – Refers to the national log of population density. The same problem occurs 
here as “Population” variable, so logged population density is used as well.  
“City” – Refers to a municipality that is in either capital or metropolitan city. These places, 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, are urban areas in this context. Although this study controls 
population and population density, dominant characteristics of city areas, capital and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
national borders discussed in this thesis, the municipality is not counted as “Internal border” even 
though it is attached to North Korea. 
43 To be specific, it would be reasonable to consider “Internal border”*”Northern border,” 
“Coast”*”Northern border,” and “Internal border”*”Coast”*”Northern border.” However, since 
there are very small numbers of municipalities for all three combinations and they are not regarded as 
important features in theories, this thesis excludes them as an independent variable.  
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metropolitan cities are likely to have exclusive features such as economic growth, education 
system, and so on, which make better sense when controlled.""    
“Island” – Refers to the municipality isolated from the Korean peninsula. These places, 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, are islands in this context.    
“PFE” – Refers to the “Province fixed effects.” Among seven provinces considered in this 
study, Seoul, Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Jeju, six 
provinces, except Seoul, are used as the “PFE” variable, taking Seoul as a baseline. Thus, six 
dummy variables are included in “Province fixed effects.”  
 
Dependent Variables"# 
Hypothesis 1 
“Out/pop” – Refers to the total number of people who move out to another province divided 
by the total population in a certain municipality.    
“Out/moving” – Refers to the total number of people who move out to another province 
divided by the total number of people who move out either to another province or within the 
same province in a certain municipality."$   
“Commute” – Refers to the total number of people who commute to other provinces divided 
by the total population in a certain municipality.  
“Intl.marriage” – Refers to the total number of international marriages divided by the total 
number of marriages in a certain municipality.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 “ln(pop),” “ln(p-density),” and “City” variables seem to be highly associated with each other. 
Thus, their correlations will be examined below.  
45 Except for voter turnout of presidential and parliamentary election, all of predicted variables are the 
dataset of 2005. Also, all variables are the normalized numbers in order to obtain decent comparisons. 
46 Compared to “Out/pop” variable, this variable shows more specified proportion of people who are 
willing to move out to foreign provinces from the total moving-out numbers. 
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Hypothesis 2 
“President” – Refers to the voter turnout of the Presidential election in 2007.   
“Parliament” – Refers to the voter turnout of the Parliamentary election in 2008. 
“Pres-parl” – Refers to the values of “President” - “Parliament” for backing the previous 
two turnout variables.    
Hypothesis 3a 
“Employed” – Refers to the total number of people employed divided by the total population 
in a certain municipality. 
“Jobs” – Refers to the total number of jobs in a certain municipality. 
“LV.residence” – Refers to the residential land value changes in a certain municipality. 
“LV.business” – Refers to the business land value changes in a certain municipality. 
Hypothesis 3b 
“Manufacturing” – Refers to the proportion of manufacturing industries in a certain 
municipality.   
“Cultivation” – Refers to the proportion of land used for agriculture in a certain 
municipality.    
 
 The aforementioned variables will be used to in accord with relating the hypotheses. 
For such a task, SPSS 15.0 is used. 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 Given dependent, independent, and control variables, this chapter presents the data 
analyses and the results of this study. As noted above, the research questions compose three 
parts!cultural, political, and economic perspectives!with four hypotheses that will be 
mostly explained by regression tests. Before the regression analyses are discussed, basic 
information about the data is described in regard with independent and control variables, 
which are consistent throughout all hypotheses. 
 Since Chapter 3 has described each variable and what its purposes, here the 
explanatory variables are illustrated on the maps to obtain a clear idea regarding the 
geographical viewpoint.47 Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 specify the internal border regions, 
coastal regions, and internal border!coastal regions versus non-border regions, which, as 
independent variables, mainly explain cultural, political, and economic human behaviors 
throughout this study. The phenomena that seem to distinguishably happen in the internal 
border regions, as shown on Figure 4.1, are mainly explained in comparison with the 
tendency of non-border locales. The characteristics of coastal areas on Figure 4.2 are 
additional findings. As previously noted, there are a few regions that are borderlands48 as 
well as coastal locations. These are the nine municipalities shaded on Figure 4.3. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 As mentioned in Chapter 3, “Northern border” indicating municipalities adjoining North Korea is 
added to continue the consistency of selecting independent variables in theories; “Northern border” 
is included in explanatory variable set only because it offers the edge of the country as coastal areas 
do. However, it is not expected to have significant ramifications in terms of all four hypotheses. 
Moreover, since it is very clear the “Northern border” variable implies those municipalities adjoining 
the northern border of South Korea, here the three main independent variables, “Internal border,” 
“Coast,” and “Internal border*coast,” are presented on the maps as simple and straightforward. 
48 Since “borders” refer to the sub-national borders in this study, “borderlands” mention the places 
adjoining sub-national boundaries seen on Figure 4.1. Then, “borderlanders” describe the people who 
live in borderlands in this context.  
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Despite the small number of cases, since maps are expected to display some hybrid 
characteristics of both border and coastal locales in theories, it may be worth including them 
as an independent variable."# 
 Another initial investigation before regression analyses would be to look at the 
correlations between the control variables in Table 4.1.$% Since the dummy variables 
referring to “Province fixed effects” are not overlapped between themselves presenting 
individual regions, their correlation values seem meaningless and are not listed below. 
Rather, the correlations of population, population density, and city variable must be closely 
examined.  
Table 4.1. Summary of correlations of control variables. 
Note: For OLS regression analyses, since natural log of population and natural log of population density are 
used, the correlation test also uses the logged value of population and population density. All samples have 
observed values without missing data, so N=234.  
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Although there are few theories about internal border•coastal areas!only theories about either 
borderlands or coasts, since the regions are grouped with internal border regions and coast areas, both 
coded as 1, “Internal border” multiplied by “Coast” would be worth including in the regression 
models. 
50 The correlations of other variables are tested, as well. And, it turns out the correlations between 
independent variables and control variables are not statistically significant. In particular, the 
correlations between independent variables and urban characteristics variables, such as population, 
population density, and city, present no statistically significant relationship between them. Hence, 
they are not tabled.!
 
ln(pop) 
ln(p-
density) City Island Gyeonggi Gangwon 
Chung-
cheong Jeolla 
Gyeong-
sang Jeju 
ln(pop) 1 .795** .455** -.201** .234** -.227** -.154* -.274** -.202** -.024 
ln(p-
density) .795** 1 .746** -.170** .122 -.282** -.206** -.311** -.315** -.092 
City .455** .746** 1 -.075 -.266** -.196** -.251** -.290** -.323** -.090 
Island -.201** -.170** -.075 1 -.091 -.067 -.086 .062 .040 .567** 
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Not surprisingly, Table 4.1 shows population, population density, and city variables 
are strongly associated demonstrating urban characteristics. Among these three variables, the 
values imply the strongest relationship between population and population density; the 
municipality with large population tends to have high population density. When it comes to 
city area, however, its associations with population and population density are somewhat 
varied. Although both have a statistically significant, positive relationship, the correlation 
between city and (natural log of) population density is .746, which is higher than .455, the 
correlation of city and population. In other words, city correlates strongly with population 
density, while it does less with the population per se. Thus, when analyzing the ordinary 
linear-squares (OLS) regressions below, note that large population does not necessarily mean 
large city area;"# rather, high population density is more likely to interpret city characteristics 
compared to the raw number of population. For province variables indicating regional 
characteristics because they do not include city areas, they have somewhat negative 
relationships with urban characteristics."$  
 
4.1. Border Effects on Cultural Phenomena 
 Although because of either border residents’ characteristics or geographical proximity 
to foreign areas, frequent interactions across borders are obviously expected around 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 It means there is a municipality with large population, but its population is not densely distributed. 
For example, Cheongju-si is the municipality that has the eighth largest population, but has average 
population density in South Korea; it is not included as a city, either. In most cases, population and 
population density exhibit a similar pattern, but the coefficients for both sometimes have conflicting 
directions.    !
52 After all, their correlations appear not as strong as ones between population, population density, 
and city variable. 
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boundaries, and the number of migrants in borderlands would shape the cultural phenomena 
in those areas. Not only moving populations, but also commuting numbers across intra-
national borders, for their work can also indicate the attribute of people in borderlands 
assumed as cosmopolitan, who are more favorable to non-native regions. Furthermore, 
international marriages, not common yet in South Korea because of its homogeneous cultural 
history, can convey the idea of how open-minded to foreigners and foreign culture border 
residents would be."#         
 Table 4.2 moderately indicates people near borders appear to be cosmopolitan 
because they are more likely to move to different provinces, work outside of their region, and 
marry foreigners compared to people elsewhere. Although it only includes independent 
variables, the regressions do not profoundly explain the phenomena. This suggests 
cosmopolitan characteristics are consistent throughout four dependent variables with 
statistically significant coefficients for border regions. 
 First, the borderland coefficients for out-migration, 1.154 for out-migrants over total 
population (Out/pop) and 6.900 for out-migrants over total moving-outs (Out/moving), show 
border residents are more willing to move from their province than people in non-border 
regions; while, people in coastal locations seem unlikely to move to foreign provinces 
compared to people elsewhere. Internal border!coastal areas exhibit puzzling coefficients, the 
one for out-migration divided by the population has a negative value, whereas the other one 
for out-migration divided by moving numbers has a positive value. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Again, in this thesis, the meaning of cosmopolitan is limited as people who do not mind dealing 
with foreignness.   !
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Table 4.2. OLS Regression results for cultural phenomena data. 
Dependent  
Variable Out/pop Out/moving Commute Intl.marriage"# 
Independent 
Variables 
    
Internal border     
  b 1.154** 6.900** 1.554* 1.396** 
  (SE) (0.381) (2.352) (0.745) (0.533) 
Coast     
  b -0.265 -2.470 -1.761* -0.444 
  (SE) (0.430) (2.652) (0.760) (0.542) 
Internal border*coast     
  b -0.374 2.540 -0.135 -1.655 
  (SE) (0.696) (4.294) (1.819) (1.298) 
Northern border     
  b 1.181* 4.752* -0.759 1.135 
  (SE) (0.793) (2.893) (1.684) (1.201) 
Constant     
  b  5.979** 34.693** 3.553** 7.657** 
  (SE) (0.321) (1.978) (0.512) (0.365) 
R2 0.104 0.058 0.072 0.057 
Note: Throughout the tables, standard errors are presented in parentheses, and standardized coefficients (B) are 
given together with regression coefficients. The levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows, unless 
indicated otherwise. OLS = ordinary least squares. N=234. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
To the extent that both have conflicting values, internal border•coastal areas would be 
neither border-like nor coastal-like. Since most coefficients, however, for coastal and internal 
border•coastal areas in this regression are not statistically significant, it would be difficult to 
interpret their characteristics with only these numbers. In addition, with respect to the 
northern border variable, it seems people near North Korea have a cosmopolitan 
characteristic. However, the following regressions adding control variables show no robust 
results; a detailed interpretation seems unnecessary. 
With only three explanatory variables, commuting and international marriage are also 
well explained by borderness. Their coefficients suggest people in the border regions are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Since there are U.S. military bases in South Korea, the U.S. military dummy variable was added to 
the running regressions about international marriage numbers. However, this was determined to not 
have any statistically significant coefficient and provides meaningless results. Therefore, the 
regression results without U.S. military dummy variable are tabled above. Also, the tendency that 
males in rural areas marry foreigners from developing countries will be explained by control 
variables, such as population and population density. 
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more willing to work outside of their province"" and to marry foreigners. Residents in coastal 
areas also show similar characteristics as seen with the out-migration variables; they interact 
less with foreignness. Yet, internal border•coastal regions have negative coefficients 
corresponding to coastal characteristics, as opposed to the out-migration regression results; 
they are not statistically significant numbers, though. In respect to constant patterns in each 
region for the four dependent variables, Table 4.2 generates positive findings for 
cosmopolitanism in the border regions. However, these interpretations should be more 
clearly confirmed by additional ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression tests including 
control variables because the explanation power of independent variables are relatively 
weak."#   
The cosmopolitan characteristics proved by four dependent variables are better 
supported by the OLS regression tests with control variables. Since urban characteristics are 
expected to strongly affect cultural human behaviors, OLS 1 includes population, population 
density, city, and island variable;"$ OLS 2 considers all control variables. With two more 
tests for each dependent variable, Table 4.3 indicates the findings from Table 4.2 are fairly 
robust except for the northern border variable, which lost statistical significance. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 As noted, even though borderlanders do not mind working outside their region because of the 
convenience of physical proximity, this sort of their life style is not meaningless but important in that 
it could possibly affect their cultural identities.   
56 The OLS regressions with three independent variables retain significance. However, r-square of the 
regressions advises further robustness checks.  
57 Indeed, Table 4.3 presents that the estimated coefficients for population, which better explain the 
cosmopolitanism; their values are higher than coefficients for border regions except for commuting 
numbers. Instead, population density and city variables relatively well explain cosmopolitanism with 
commuting numbers. Also, Gyeonggi, which is the province adjoining Seoul, explains much about 
cosmopolitan characteristics with its coefficient of 6.900 on commuting. 
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Table 4.3. OLS Regression results for cultural phenomena for various models. 
 OLS Models 
 Out/pop Out/moving Commute Intl.marriage 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Internal Border         
   b 1.427** 1.405** 6.843** 6.801** 1.428* 0.872+ 1.449** 1.457** 
   (SE) (0.354) (0.341) (1.751) (1.585) (0.634)! (0.583) (0.479) (0.464) 
Coast         
   b -0.323 -0.602 0.056 -1.162+ -1.273+ -0.994+ -0.496 -0.662 
   (SE) (0.410) (0.400) (2.026) (1.930) (0.675) (0.612) (0.509) (0.487) 
Internal 
border*coast 
        
   b -0.314 -0.049 -0.865 0.313 -0.339 -0.074 -1.769 -1.800 
   (SE) (0.638) (0.617) (3.156) (2.975) (1.545) (1.381) (1.165) (1.098) 
Northern border         
  b! 0.515+ 1.080 -0.719 5.405 1.963 0.069 -0.453 0.961 
  (SE) (0.628) (0.671) (3.602) (3.714) (1.445) (1.419) (1.088) (1.128) 
ln(pop)         
   b -1.344** -1.207** -7.122** -6.135** 0.077 -0.067 -1.788** -1.698** 
   (SE) (0.230) (0.224) (1.136) (1.080) (0.441) (0.399) (0.332) (0.318) 
ln(p-density)          
   b 0.285+ 0.325* -1.210+ -0.711 1.686** 0.977** 0.131 -0.056 
   (SE) (0.147) (0.152) (0.726) (0.731) (0.279) 0.265 (0.212) (0.212) 
City         
   b -0.530  -0.902  -3.953**  -0.112  
   (SE) (0.450)  (2.224)  (0.890)  (0.679)  
Island         
   b -0.390 -0.369 -2.203 3.430 0.424 0.238 -1.809+ -1.963+ 
   (SE) (0.650) (0.752) (3.217) (3.622) (1.267) (1.361) (0.955) (1.082) 
Gyeonggi         
   b  -0.139  -2.858*  6.900**  0.290 
   (SE)  (0.472)  (2.275)  (0.881)  (0.710) 
Gangwon         
   b  0.501  -0.286  -0.144  -3.402** 
   (SE)  (0.715)  (3.445)  (1.296)  (1.034) 
Chungcheong         
   b  1.411  4.391+  0.046  -0.535 
   (SE)  (0.580)  (2.794)  (1.066)  (0.850) 
Jeolla         
   b  1.896**  4.149+  0.406  1.222 
   (SE)  (0.590)  (2.844)  (1.057)  (0.845) 
Gyeongsang         
   b  0.078  2.699  0.401  -1.258 
   (SE)  (0.562)  (2.710)  (1.017)  (0.813) 
Jeju         
   b  -0.642  -13.238*  -0.223  -0.674 
   (SE)  (1.261)  (6.077)  (2.304)  (1.833) 
Constant         
   b 20.029** 17.504** 127.557** 110.106** -7.115+ -3.016 27.999** 28.458** 
   (SE) (2.068) (2.061) (10.229) (9.930) (4.076) (3.791) (3.075) (3.021) 
R2 0.292 0.363 0.521 0.591 0.358 0.504 0.272 0.374 
Adj. R2 0.267 0.325 0.504 0.567! 0.335 0.475 0.246 0.337!
Note: OLS 1 and 2 do not have any other additional controls besides the variables on the table; all coefficients 
from the regression tests are reported. Using all control variables, City variable has been excluded because it has 
repeated information with “Province fixed effects” dummy variables. N=234. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
All dependent variables used for representing cosmopolitan characteristics have 
estimated coefficients for border region statistically significant at p < .10 level, and their 
standard errors shrink from Table 4.2. It straightforwardly demonstrates that people near 
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borders do have an open-minded approach to non-native regions and people; moreover, they 
are assumed not to remain in their own region. Although this could be somewhat caused by a 
simple, short distance advantage from foreign provinces, their interactive relationship with 
others appears clearly.  
Conversely, people in coastal locations show non-cosmopolitan attributes. For the 
four variables, coastal regions have negative coefficients inferring people who live in coasts 
are unlikely to mix with foreignness. Although the coefficients for international marriage are 
not explanatory, they do not seem meaningless because they correspond to the patterns of the 
other variables indicating non-cosmopolitanism in coasts. With this same logic, it may 
indicate that border offers a better chance to have exchanges with people from elsewhere.  
For internal border!coastal regions, there is little to interpret as a result of no 
statistical significance. This means their regional conditions do not explain much about the 
cosmopolitanism of internal border!coastal residents. Yet, the pattern shown in Table 4.2 that 
was puzzling!positive for out-migrants over moving-outs, but negative for out-migrants 
over total population, commute, and international marriage!has not been changed. Thus, it 
can be assumed that, for cultural matters, neither border nor coastal inclined characteristics 
appear in internal border!coastal regions; the two characteristics cancel out each other; 
otherwise, it depends upon the issue. 
 To sum up, cultural phenomena near borders are relatively clear; it may seem banal, 
though. It does confirm that border residents tend to be more cosmopolitan!they would 
have more reasons to be cosmopolitan!in comparison with people elsewhere. One 
interesting finding is that even though openness to different countries leading to international 
marriage seems to be the least expectation for borderlanders, it turns out to be statistically the 
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most significant. Whether or not controlling the population density,"# it remains surprisingly 
stable.  
 
4.2. Border Effects on Political Engagement 
In South Korea, political party preferences are typically strongly attached to regional 
separation along the primary sub-national borders. Historically, this territory-based political 
cleavage first emerged in the early 1970s (Park, 2003) between the two largest provinces, 
such as Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do,"$ which are in the eastern and western parts of South 
Korea, and has stretched to the other provinces over political elections.%& Therefore, regional 
party preference comes to be a key player in elections in South Korea. Political participation, 
however, is a different matter, and as stated, it is expected to better explain how people 
differently behave in terms of borderness.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 As noted, on account of female underpopulation, men in rural areas are encouraged to marry 
foreigners at times; therefore, by controlling urban characteristics, OLS regression wipes off this 
contemporary tendency. The coefficient for (natural log of) population in terms of international 
marriage on OLS 2, which is -1.769, explains it is controlling the tendency for people in a 
municipality with a large population to less likely marry foreigners.  !
59 Through military governments in 1970-80’s, South Korea has had presidents from Gyeongsang-do, 
but not from Jeolla-do, which resulted in dramatic economic development in Gyeongsang-do. 
Moreover, the political disagreement between the candidates for the first democratic government, one 
is from Gyeongsang-do and the other from Jeolla-do, decisively mobilized people in accord with their 
regional identity. After regional political support became a regular political issue, other provinces 
such as Chungcheong-do tried to have their regional political party win elections, but they had little 
power due to their underpopulation and their weak motivation compared to Jeolla and Gyeongsang-
do. !
60 Despite the fact that regional issues are frequently criticized as a culprit of Korean politics, 
politicians cunningly encourage regional supports for their advantage over campaigns.  !
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The difference in political participation between border regions and non-border 
regions in a unitary nation is somewhat questionable because there are conflicting ideas."# 
Nonetheless, considering South Korean political circumstances and sub-national borders, the 
political engagement through voting near borders is expected to be less than that in other 
regions because of the decline in regional-based competition.  
For blunt comparison between border and non-border regions, the mean differences in 
voter turnout are tested by the t-test."$ As seen on Table 4.4, the average voter turnout 
between border and non-border area is not statistically different with p < .05 level. However, 
in terms of the third variable that indicates the differences between presidential and 
parliamentary election turnouts, the test suggests there exists certain characteristics that can 
be differentiated by not only regions, but also the type of political election.  
Table 4.4. Independent samples t-test results for voter turnout. 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances T-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 F Sig. t df 
Significance  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference  Upper Lower 
.267 .606 1.583 232 .115 .948 .599 -.232 2.127 
President 
  1.621 177.669 .107 .948 .585 -.206 2.102 
.067 .796 -1.526 232 .128 -1.527 1.000 -3.497 .444 
Parliament 
    -1.522 164.621 .130 -1.527 1.003 -3.507 .454 
.656 .419 3.096 232 .002 2.475 .799 .900 4.050 
Pres-parl 
    3.169 177.613 .002 2.475 .781 .934 4.015 
Note: The mean differences are calculated values: voter turnout in non-border region – voter turnout in border 
region.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 As reviewed in Chapter 2, the absence of the escapability of policies may cause no difference in 
voter turnout between border and non-border region, while the degree of partisanship in border 
region, which could be weak, could possibly make borderlanders vote less than non-border residents.    
62 For other dependent variables, the t-test for mean differences does not seem necessary because the 
values for each municipality vary considerably, so they need regression tests to be controlled by 
seemingly influential aspects. However, voter turnout for 234 cases does not dramatically vary, so the 
t-test is expected to help with initial information about the dataset.  
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As seen on Table 4.4, the estimated mean differences between border and non-border 
regions for the differences between presidential and parliamentary election turnout, named as 
Pres-parl, are positive."# This suggests border residents and non-border residents have 
different voting behaviors for national and local elections. The results do not interpret 
straightforwardly since they exhibit statistical significance only with the third variable, an 
ambiguous number, and they do not include other parameters that could possibly explain the 
tendency better.  
 Having brief information about voting behaviors in border versus non-border regions, 
the simple ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions with only explanatory variables are 
initially run, and Table 4.5 presents the findings.  
Table 4.5. OLS regression results for voter turnout data. 
Dependent  
Variable President Parliament Pres-parl 
Independent 
Variables 
   
Internal Border    
  b -1.468* 1.657 -3.124** 
  (SE) (0.695) (1.169) (0.918) 
Coast    
  b -1.496* 0.883 -2.379* 
  (SE) (0.710) (1.193) (0.937) 
Internal border*coast    
  b 0.016 0.804 -0.787 
  (SE) (1.697) (2.852) (2.240) 
Northern border    
  b 0.580 3.551 -2.971 
  (SE) (1.572) (2.641) (2.075) 
Constant    
  b  65.430** 48.955** 16.475** 
  (SE) (0.477) (0.802) (0.630) 
R2 0.034 0.022 0.083 
Note: OLS regressions for President and Parliament are run with simple voter turnout for each  
municipality, and Pres-parl means the raw number subtractions. N=234. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Positive number of mean differences means the value for the non-border region is bigger than the 
value for the border region. This could mean the less participation in a presidential election, but more 
participation in parliamentary election near borders. 
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Table 4.5 apparently shows borderlanders are less likely to participate in presidential 
elections than people elsewhere, while they do not seem to have distinct characteristics of 
voting behavior on parliamentary elections."# The negative estimated coefficient for border 
regions on presidential election -1.468 is statistically significant, which confirms the t-tests 
results that borderlanders may engage in presidential elections less than others. 
Moreover, border effects on political participation become clearer on ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regression of differences of presidential and parliamentary elections’ voter 
turnouts. The variance coefficient is -3.124 for the border region, which is a quite notable 
number, compared to other coefficient values for coastal or internal border!coastal region; 
moreover, it is significant at p < .01. That is, returning to the previous regressions stating 
people near borders do not join in presidential elections as much as non-border residents; 
while, non-border residents do not join in parliamentary elections as much as border 
residents."$ 
For robustness checks, various regressions were calculations using three sets of 
combinations. In Table 4.6, OLS 1 is run with (natural log of) population and (natural log of) 
population density as control variables. They should add the most powerful influences on 
explanation by OLS regression results;"" then, regional conditions such as city and island are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Despite its statistical insignificance, the positive coefficients for border region in terms of 
parliamentary election make better sense to t-test results implying people near borders are more 
interested in voting for parliaments than for the president. 
65 The estimated coefficients suggest that coastal regions follow border characteristics. And, internal 
border•coastal regions do not necessarily have a certain tendency on national and local elections. 
66 It turned out that population affects election results the most compared among other dependent 
variables throughout this study. Therefore, political engagement comes to include OLS regression 
only with population and population density.  
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added in OLS 2; finally, province dummy variables are added for regional specific 
information. 
Table 4.6. OLS regression results for voter turnout for various models. 
 OLS Models 
 President Parliament Pres-parl 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Internal border          
   b -1.521* -1.423* -2.514** 1.517+ 1.463+! 2.598** -3.038** -2.886** -2.832** 
   (SE) (0.600) (0.599) (0.788) (0.809) (0.808) (0.769) (0.786) (0.764) (0.738) 
Coast          
   b -2.073** -1.678** -1.705** -0.473 -1.105 -0.798 -1.600* -0.573 -0.907 
   (SE) (0.611) (0.638) (0.548) (0.824) (0.861) (0.808) (0.801) (0.814) (0.775) 
Internal 
border*coast 
         
   b -0.092 -0.205 -0.871 0.968 1.563 0.749 -0.876 -1.768 -1.620 
   (SE) (1.455) (1.460) (1.236) (1.963) (1.969) (1.821) (1.907) (1.862) (1.748) 
Northern border          
   b -1.876 -2.070 0.858 -2.220 -1.951 0.106 0.345 -0.119 0.752 
   (SE) (1.373) (1.366) (1.270) (1.853) (1.841) (1.872) (1.800) (1.742) (1.797) 
ln(pop)          
   b -1.551** -1.432** -1.403** -3.565** -3.560** -3.707** 2.014** 2.128** 2.303** 
   (SE) (0.397) (0.417) (0.357) (0.535) (0.562) (0.527) (0.520) (0.532) (0.506) 
ln(p-density)           
   b -0.386* -0.656* -0.384 -0.944** -0.781* -0.159 0.558* 0.125 -0.225 
   (SE) (0.189) (0.264) (0.237) (0.255) (0.356) (0.350) (0.248) (0.337) (0.335) 
City          
   b  1.162   -0.644   1.806*  
   (SE)  (0.842)   (1.135)   (1.073)  
Island          
   b  -2.310+ -1.917  3.770* 2.907+  -6.080** -4.824** 
   (SE)  (1.197) (1.218)  (1.614) (1.795)  (1.527) (1.723) 
Gyeonggi          
   b   -0.234   -1.654   -0.860 
   (SE)   (0.522)   (1.162)   (1.115) 
Gangwon          
   b   -3.323**   2.568   -5.890** 
   (SE)   (1.160)   (1.709)   (1.641) 
Chungcheong          
   b   -3.538**   1.459   -4.997** 
   (SE)   (-.954)   (1.406)   (1.349) 
Jeolla          
   b   1.586   1.763   -0.177 
   (SE)   (0.946)   (1.394)   (1.338) 
Gyeongsang          
   b   2.570**   6.258**   -3.688** 
   (SE)   (0.910)   (1.341)   (1.288) 
Jeju          
   b   -2.909   4.948   -7.858** 
   (SE)   (2.063)   (3.040)   (2.918) 
Constant          
   b 86.418** 86.344** 84.485** 97.573** 96.670** 92.054** -11.155 * -10.326* -7.570+ 
   (SE) (3.795) (3.854) (3.393) (5.120) (5.196) (5.001) (4.973) (4.914) (4.800) 
R2 0.297 0.314 0.525 0.542 0.553 0.630 0.343 0.393 0.482 
Adj. R2 0.279 0.290 0.497 0.529 0.537 0.608 0.326 0.371 0.452!
Note: Unexpected, but seemingly strong results on initial tests lead to detailed three sets of combinations. For 
robustness checks, OLS 1 includes the population and population density; additional regions are added in OLS 
2; OLS 3 includes all control variables automatically excluding city variable. N=234. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 4.6 shows OLS regression results for political phenomena are reasonably 
steady, in general, corresponding to the results from Table 4.5. Throughout OLS 1-3 
regressions for all dependent variables, the coefficients for border regions retain their 
negative, positive, and negative values for presidential, parliamentary, and the differences of 
the two, respectively. They do not seem to vary considerably by controlling other variables. 
Furthermore, they are all significant at least at p < .05 level, and some of them are significant 
at p < .01. This strongly indicates that people near sub-national borders are more likely to 
vote for presidential candidates, but less to vote for parliamentary candidates than people in 
non-border areas. 
On the other hand, municipalities along the coastal line display the similar 
phenomenon in presidential voting behavior with border regions; whereas, their voting 
behavior for parliaments is quite the opposite as border regions. Although their coefficients 
are not statistically significant, it seems coastal residents are not interested in both elections 
compared to people elsewhere."#   
The OLS regression results for the variation between two political events support the 
previous regression results; they indicate a different pattern for borderland’s voting behavior 
as noted above. Since the differences between presidential and parliamentary election voter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Since internal border•coastal regions do not exhibit statistically significant coefficient values, it 
seems the two regional characteristics cancel out each other. One question that can arise in this 
context is about the coefficient for internal border•costal region in terms of presidential election, 
which is supposedly to have a higher value indicating both border and coastal characteristics. 
However, to the extent that it still remains a negative value and is not statistically significant, this 
study focuses more on characteristics of border areas. 
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turnout near borders are noticeable, it additionally suggests that people on the edge of a 
province may have different motivations for presidential and parliamentary elections."# 
 
4.3. Border Effects on Economic Performance 
 Border effects on economic performances are indeed the most evident findings on 
border studies, so their tendency in a unitary nation could be compared with previous ones. 
However, it turns out that border effects in a unitary nation tend to have somewhat different 
features as opposed to national and sub-national border effects in a federation. 
By the same strategy, ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions with only independent 
variables were first run, but unlike earlier tests, theses results do not show a clear 
interpretation on economic performance in border regions; even the regressions per se were 
not statistically significant.!Thus, OLS regressions with all control variables are run, as seen 
in Table 4.7. Still, this does not present much about economic activities in borderlands, not as 
much as expected to be; however, these coefficients offer some information about what 
happens on the edge of provinces.  
First of all, regarding the first four dependent variables as the indices of economic 
growth, estimated coefficients for them, except for land value changes in residential area 
(LV.residence), suggest that border regions are not statistically different from other areas. 
Especially, their values seem relatively trivial compared to the coefficients for the control 
variables, so they do not seem to have explanatory power in terms of economic growth."$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 There are two possible reasons and they are discussed in Chapter 5. 
69 For example, the coefficient for border region in employed regression is .280, while the coefficient 
for island is 4.823. Also, other regional dummy variables have critical values such as -5.260 and 
3.847 at p < .01 level. 
 48!
Table 4.7. OLS regression results for economic activity for various models. 
 OLS Models 
 Employed Jobs LV.residence LV.business Manufacturing Cultivation 
Internal border       
   b 0.280 -3.845 0.127+ 0.031 3.269* -0.943+ 
   (SE) (0.728) (3.422) (0.073) (0.074) (1.750) (0.566) 
Coast       
   b -0.730 -2.088 0.143+ 0.097 0.710 2.395+ 
   (SE) (0.764) (3.592) (0.076) (0.078) (2.757) (1.506) 
Internal 
border*coast 
      
   b -1.508 4.652 -0.065 0.043 8.321** 1.916 
   (SE) (1.723) (8.100) (0.172) (0.176) (3.231) (2.473) 
Northern border       
   b -0.201 2.028 0.098 0.011 4.406 -0.311 
   (SE) (1.771) (8.326) (0.177) (0.181) (4.056) (3.655) 
ln(pop)       
   b -2.055** -10.472** 0.062 0.096* 5.307** 1.231 
   (SE) (0.498) (2.343) (0.050) (0.051) (1.141) (0.843) 
ln(p-density)        
   b -1.463** 0.418 -0.030 -0.075* -0.710 -0.824 
   (SE) (0.331) (1.555) (0.033) (0.034) (0.757) (1.280) 
Island       
   b 4.823** -2.717 0.013 -0.114 -0.751 0.171 
   (SE) (1.698) (7.983) (0.169) (0.182) (3.881) (2.823) 
Gyeonggi       
   b 1.829+ -4.312 0.375 0.343** 5.541* 2.538 
   (SE) (1.099) (5.167) (0.110) (0.113) (2.440) (1.779) 
Gangwon       
   b -5.260** -14.325+ -0.057 -0.070 -11.617** -3.495 
   (SE) (1.617) (7.603) (0.161) (0.167) (3.704) (2.650) 
Chungcheong       
   b 0.948 -5.921 -0.324* -0.358** -2.184 6.606** 
   (SE) (1.330) (6.252) (0.133) (0.138) (2.993) (2.193) 
Jeolla       
   b 3.847** -3.740 -0.298* -0.321** -10.164** 5.492* 
   (SE) (1.319) (6.202) (0.132) (0.138) (3.021) (2.277) 
Gyeongsang       
   b 2.082+ -4.695 -0.106 -0.001 -2.915 1.304 
   (SE) (1.269) (5.967) (0.127) (0.132) (2.833) (2.111) 
Jeju       
   b 1.829 2.714 -0.001 -0.041 -16.696* -8.745* 
   (SE) (2.875) (13.520) (0.287) (0.304) (6.586) (4.742) 
Constant       
   b 85.426** 182.409** -0.324 -0.300 -38.126** -3.420 
   (SE) (4.730) (22.242) (0.472) (0.489) (10.835) (7.743) 
R2 0.666 0.183 0.225 0.200 0.416 0.393 
Adj. R2 0.646 0.135 0.179 0.152 0.381 0.375 
Note: The OLS regression for cultivation variable is run with other dummy variable named “Plain” variable. 
There should be naturally favorable conditions for agriculture, and those regions are called plain in South 
Korea. The municipalities with plain areas are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Since the coefficient for this control 
variable is considerably high as expected, it is not reported. N=234. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
In terms of other independent variables, coastal and internal border!coastal regions do not 
present important variations, while control variables better explain the economic growth; the 
northern border variable does not offer any powerful results for all dependent variables about 
economic phenomena. 
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One possible interpretation for economic growth would be that border regions are 
becoming popular for residential areas. However, because the values of land value changes in 
residential area (LV.residence) are a one-year fixed rate, it cannot be compared whether 
border or non-border region is a more concentrated residential area; this makes it difficult to 
consider border regions as favorable places to live. Furthermore, the coefficient for internal 
border•coastal region is not consistent with two regional characteristics. 
Second, in terms of economic type theory with manufacturing and cultivation 
variables, Table 4.7 suggests a likelihood of the type of industry that better fits borderlands. 
The border condition more favorable to manufacturing industry rather than others, e.g., 
agricultural industry, examined in this study, is proven to a certain extent. A manufacturing 
coefficient of 3.269 implies the prosperity of production business near borders. It may not be 
caused by the same reason that Holmes (1996) maintains the popularity of the border region 
for manufacturing industry, since South Korea is a unitary nation. However, this must be due 
to regional convenience for trade and transportation. The relatively high coefficient of 8.321 
for internal border!coastal region supports the same logic. 
For a comparison between the different types of industry, the cultivation variable has 
been used to refer to the agricultural variable. Even though the cultivation regression includes 
the “Plain” variable to control for natural conditions, it could be slightly biased."# However, 
in general, the negative coefficient for border regions in terms of the cultivation variable 
relatively supports the popularity of manufacturing industry in the borderlands.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 The “Plain” variable refers to the municipality that is defined as in the “Plain” in South Korea. 
However, there are considerable agricultural places around rivers, which is not named as “Plain.” The 
coefficient for coastal region of 2.395 might suggest that because the rivers in South Korea tends to 
start from the oceans.    
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 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
 In terms of the two thesis questions, the study’s results present a positive finding for 
the cultural hypothesis and somewhat varied findings for the political and economic 
hypotheses. The results for cosmopolitanism in borderlands have been fairly consistent, even 
though they still have room for debate on the direct causation. And, surprisingly, in economic 
performance, where previous theories provided the most powerful expectation of border 
effects, sub-national border effects in a unitary nation turn out to be minor. Instead, it was 
political phenomena in border regions that saw an interesting, robust ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) regression results.  
 As the findings on cultural and economic phenomena are relatively descriptive by the 
regression results per se, possible explanations for political engagement in internal border 
regions, in comparison with non-border regions, must be discussed. The stories about 
political participation in borderlands would require additional research, but they seem fairly 
corresponding to the analytical results from Chapter 4. Following these arguments, the 
conclusion summarizing all three hypotheses suggests overall implications and further 
research.  
 
5.1. Discussions on Border Effects 
As summarized in Chapter 2, the border effects have been mostly studied in terms of 
their economic implications. For both international borders and intra-national borders, their 
effects have been seen with “home bias” theories in that borders split up economic flows as 
they divide regions. However, as many scholars have mentioned (Anderson, 1983; Alvarez, 
1995; Wilson and Donnan, 1998), borders are not just physically disjointed points; they have 
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more implications for politics and identity. To the extent that the results of sub-national 
border effects on political phenomena clearly show the robust consistency, therefore, it 
would be worth analyzing how this tendency on the edge occurs consistently. 
In a unitary nation like South Korea, the border effects on political participation seem 
to be questionable because of little theoretical backgrounds, while political party preferences 
along the sub-national borderlines have been seemingly detectable. However, this study 
suggests sub-national borders do affect how many"# border residents engage in presidential 
and parliamentary election through their voting rights. In comparison with people in non-
border regions, the findings indicate that people who live in borderlands are less likely to 
vote for president, but more likely to vote for parliamentary candidates. Even with the third 
generated dependent variable, the subtraction of parliamentary turnout from presidential 
turnout, the  borderlanders’ propensity to vote has not changed. 
Two scenarios can be discussed. First, it would be caused by the variation of 
residents’ hometown in border regions. As found in the cultural hypothesis test, people near 
borders tend to be more wanderlust than people elsewhere; the cosmopolitan border residents 
are not reluctant to live in a foreign district, and they are willing to marry foreigners. This 
suggests that borderlands have more people with different regional backgrounds."$ For 
instance, if a person has been moving to or from the different province even if due to their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 As mentioned before, this study used only quantitative voter turnout for presidential and 
parliamentary election without regarding to how strongly people are willing to participate in politics. 
Thus, it should be better saying “how many,” in this context.  
72 For regional background search, the total number of population of moving-in from different 
province has been examined. The results demonstrate a positive relationship between borderland and 
moving-in numbers.   
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physical closeness to other provinces,"# has been working with people from other provinces, 
and has been married to a person from different province or country, it should reflect their 
regional identity as more tolerant for others. Thus, when it comes to presidential election, 
which is more regionally divided in South Korea, borderlanders would not be encouraged as 
much as people elsewhere to support the particularly regional political party.  
However, regarding parliamentary elections, people who do not live along sub-
national borders, but live around the center of a province,"$ seem to have less incentives to 
vote for parliaments than people in border areas. Since non-border residents tend to have 
strong regionally-attached political preferences, the results of the vote in these regions would 
be more biased than the results expected for borderlands with regional diversity. This 
certainty on political preference in non-border regions is likely to depress the turnout for 
parliamentary elections; while, in border regions, people would be aware that parliamentary 
elections in their own municipality tend to be more competitive compared to other 
municipalities.  
Based on these two stories, the voting tendency in border regions versus non-border 
regions seems reasonable. Although these two sorts of regions do not seem to differ at the 
first glance by the initial t-test, by controlling influential variables and increasing the 
explanatory power of regressions, border areas appear to have interesting, differentiating 
characteristics in terms of political participation. Moreover, the fact that the political results 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Assuming people take time and money moving for 30 km, people near borders would have a 
greater chance to end up living in a different province even though they do not take borderness into 
account. 
74 Since OLS regression includes the coastal area as another independent variable, non-border 
regions, which are the baseline of the regression tests, should mean more central areas.    
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are supported by another hypothesis test such as cultural phenomena in borderlands suggests 
stronger interpretations; this suggests cultural identity such as regional attachment plays an 
important role in political behaviors.   
 
5.2. Conclusion 
 Inspired by geographical impacts on human societies, this research has been started 
by asking how people would be affected by borders in accordance to their cultural, political, 
and economic behaviors. As national frontiers, international borders play a significant role, 
despite the “borderless world” argument. Intra-national borders, on the other hand, vary in 
accordance with their jurisdictional powers; borders within a federation are expected to have 
more effects than within a unitary nation borders.  
 Against previous theories that studied border effects along with institutional 
differences mostly about economic implications, this paper examined borderness in three 
perspectives with no institutional differences. Using various regression analyses, it was 
determined that the sub-national border effects exist; furthermore, it can be concluded there 
are other factors than institutional differences, which generate border effects in a unitary 
nation."# 
 For cultural phenomena, cosmopolitanism in borderlands is positively found. The 
frequent interactions around border areas indicate the borderlanders’ characteristics of being 
open-minded to foreign districts and people. These results are not considerably strong, but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 In Alvarez’s (1995) terms, the concepts inherent in the borders are alert to the shifting of behavior 
and identity and the reconfiguration of social patterns at the dynamic interstices of cultural practices. 
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the consistency of the tests suggests their more favorable attitude to non-nativeness compared 
to people in non-border regions.  
 This supports the second findings about political engagement to a certain extent. The 
cosmopolitan characteristics in borderlands and the diversity of regional backgrounds, due to 
interactions across borders, make people less interested in regionally-divided competition. 
Conversely, parliamentary election turnouts in non-border regions tend to be lower than 
elsewhere because people would be aware that regionally-attached support would end up 
with quite biased results and this fact can depress the turnout. In other words, regional 
identity determines how people engage in political elections by means of vote; borderlanders 
are less likely to participate in presidential elections, equally competitive across 
municipalities, while non-borderlands people are less motivated to vote in parliamentary 
elections, not so much competitive in non-border municipalities. 
Sub-national border effects on economic activity seem to have limited implications. 
Although the hypotheses expected border effects on economic growth and type of industry, 
the results only support the latter hypothesis. This suggests that intra-national borders in a 
unitary nation would play a quite different role compared to other border examples. The 
prosperity of manufacturing industry in border regions, for example, tends to be derived from 
the trade advantage at the boundaries, rather than policies emphasized with respect to other 
border effects. 
Given the results of this study and the likelihood examples explaining the phenomena 
in borderlands, this paper concludes that sub-national borders with weak jurisdictional power 
do also have cultural implications for regional identity, but have varied effects from other 
borders as powerful jurisdictional lines. Therefore, this suggests that borderlands in a unitary 
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nation would be a more suitable place to solve nationally-competitive issues because they 
tend to not strongly belong to a certain regional characteristics. In terms of political 
campaigns, moreover, borderlands would need to be more encouraged to vote for president to 
mitigate regional division to the South Korean extent. On the other hand, it would be a 
pessimistic argument that borderlands have much potential for economic growth by large 
volume of trade.            
 However, this study leaves room for sub-national border effects on economic 
activities. Due to data unavailability, the research on intra-national trade has not been 
attempted. Although it is possible to assume the volume of trade by the proportion of 
manufacturing industry, the actual values of import and export trade across individual 
municipalities would allow a direct comparison of “home bias” effects from sub-national 
borders in a unitary nation with previous findings. Also, for political implications, the 
election data from various years would help to determine the strength of the results.  
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